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Footnotes 30I. Introduction
The persistent debt crisis of mayor LDC-borrowers has led to
various proposals on how to ease or even solve these problems.
Most suggestions have in common that they concentrate on re-
structuring the old loans and suggest approaches to higher future
lending . These proposals are based on the assumption that the
debt burden accumulated in the past represents the main obstacle
to new bank lending in the future. It has to be doubted, however,
that debt relief in one form or another will be sufficient for
generating new lending. The high debt burden constitutes only one
reason for the reluctance of banks to provide fresh money volun-
tarily. A more fundamental reason may be related to the behavior
of creditors and borrowers that lead to the present instability
of the international credit market. This behavior is influenced
by the institutional incentive structure prevailing in this mar-
ket. New lending would, therefore, be conditional on an improved
institutional framework in the international credit market.
The importance of institutional incentives derives from their
impact on the distribution of risks between creditors and bor-
rowers associated with international lending. It has been sugges-
ted that debt problems are likely to occur in the future again
even if the present repayment problems were solved, because
2
future loans will bear the same risks as the present ones . If
that is true incentives for risk-reduction and more risk-sharing
between creditors and borrowers are an essential ingredient to
the solution of the debt problem.For the purpose of the following analysis it is useful to dif-
ferentiate the risk associated with a country loan into three
categories:
- economic policy risk
- exogenous shock risk
- sovereign risk.
National credit markets provide an example of mechanisms for
risk-reduction and risk-sharing which may also be able to promote
increased stability of international credit relations. In natio-
nal markets, bankruptcy laws create a disincentive for the bor-
rower to become unable to repay a loan for reasons within his own
responsibility while composition laws provide a solution for the
inability to pay due to reasons beyond the control of the borro-
wer. However, loans to sovereign states are not only subject to
the risk of a reduced ability to pay but also to the risk of the
borrower's unwillingness to repay the loan . The so called sover-
eign risk in international lending renders it difficult to apply
national concepts of risk treatment to international loans. For
that reason it will be considered in this paper, if sovereign
risk can be reduced by establishing incentives that strengthen
the borrowing country's willingness to repay loans. Less sover-
eign risk will make national concepts of risk reduction and risk
sharing more easily applicable to international lending. This is
supposed to encourage risk-sharing between the borrower and the
lender in cases of exogenous shocks that reduce the borrowing
country's ability to pay. A modified institutional framework may
also generate disincentives to apply ill-advised economic policy
in the borrowing countries, so that the stability of future cred-it relations in the international market would be further
strenghened.
When the risk-illusion had been destroyed, which prevailed in
international lending during the seventies the risks mentioned
above now constitute an important reason for the insufficient net
4
capital transfer to the mayor Latin-American LDC-borrowers . This
consideration is confirmed by the fact that the reduced and
since 1983 - even negative net transfers to these countries were
mainly caused by a reduction in the new credit commitments. This
indicates that the reduction of the debt burden via reschedulings
was not successful in reducing the risks for future loans. As
long as the institutional organization of the international cred-
it market remains unchanged each new loan commitment is associa-
ted with the present risks. We thus have to look for other in-
struments to cope with the credit risks and to stabilize the
credit relations in order to increase net capital transfers.
Section II. shows the crucial role of sovereign risk for the
applicability of domestic concepts of risk treatment in the in-
ternational credit market. In Section III. a contract system to
reduce sovereign risk is proposed and Section IV. discusses the
creditor's incentives for more risk-sharing implied by the con-
tract system. The chances to introduce such a system are evalua-
ted in Section V.4
II. Risks in Domestic and International Lending
Instruments, which help to maintain lending even in an environ-
ment that has proven risky in the past, can be found in the na-
tional credit markets. Bank lending to domestic firms faces risks
that are equivalent to the economic policy and exogenous shock
risks in the country case. After the loan is disbursed the firm
may perform poorly and be no longer able to service the loan
because of misguided management decisions or exogenous changes in
5
its market . The banks have developed instruments to limit the
impact of these risks on the profitability of their loans. They
are often willing to reschedule a loan after a reduction of the
firm's ability to pay has taken place. Rescheduling and the as-
sociated sharing of risks with the borrower will be profitable
for the banks, if the restructured loan has an increased expected
present value, because reducing the debt increases its repayment
probability. In general banks will agree to risk sharing arrange-
ments, if the management policies of the debtor firm are on the
whole sound and credible, i.e. the reduced ability to pay is due
to exogenous shocks. However, banks will refuse to participate in
risk sharing, if they believe misguided management policies to be
the reason for the payment problems. Management failures that are
expected to occur again in the future expose the rescheduled loan
to the same risk as the old one and, therefore, discourage risk-
sharing on the side of the banks. In such cases, banks will pre-
fer to implement bankruptcy provisions.
Depending on what measures serve his interest best the creditordecides to enforce the repayment of his claim as far as this is
possible and without regard to the survival of the firm (bank-
ruptcy) , or to reschedule the loan contingent on improvements in
the firm's management (composition). A firm claiming inability to
pay due to exogenous shocks and asking for rescheduling has to be
aware of the options open to the creditors. Bankruptcy measures
are generally more costly for the firm than servicing the loan as
long as its ability to pay is given. Therefore, firms will seek
to prevent management decisions that may reduce its ability to
pay . With respect to these arguments firms will request renego-
tiations only if the reduced ability to pay is due to exogenous
shocks.
The debtor-creditor relations prevailing in international credit
markets differ from those described above. Due to the lack of an
international legal system claims against international borrowers
cannot be enforced. The position of banks is much weaker in the
international than in the national context when deciding on re-
schedulings. A bank may reject a rescheduling, because the demand
for it is supposed to be due to policy failures or unwillingness
to pay. However, banks have no means to enforce the repayment of
claims which the borrowing country is still able to repay. With
lacking enforceability the borrowing country has also no incen-
tive to repay the highest amount possible. If the country is
unwilling to pay, payments may unilaterally be reduced to a de-
gree that is even more unfavourable for the creditor than the
terms he could have reached in renegotiations. Therefore, the
banks' response to the demand for reschedulings by LDCs is biasedin favour of an acceptance to minimize the probability of uni-
lateral actions by the sovereign borrower. This situation has
consequences for the behavior of creditors and borrowers:
The borrowing LDCs obtain reschedulings not only in cases of
exogenous shocks, but will also request softer loan terms, if
policy failures reduce their ability to pay or if they are
unwilling to pay.
The banks have no incentive to differentiate between resche-
duling requests due to exogenous shocks, internal policy fail-
ures, or unwillingness to pay. They take reschedulings as uni-
form events and try to minimize the negative effects on pro-
fitability. This leads to a reluctance of banks to participate
in risk-sharing agreements also in cases of exogenous shocks.
A lower sovereign risk would have two effects. First, less sover-
eign risk would reduce the overall credit risk. Secondly, re-
ducing sovereign risk should lead to a reduction in the economic
policy risk and improve the stability of credit relations in
international markets. This should be the case, because reducing
the incentives for the borrowing country to defer payments due to
unwillingness to pay promotes increased risk sharing on the side
of the creditors. These expectations are based on the following
considerations. Today the costs in terms of an increased debt
burden arising from policy failures of LDCs may be socialized by
asking for reschedulings. In such cases banks should actually
refuse debt relief irrespective of whether the misguided policies
have reduced the country's ability to pay or increased its unwil-lingness to pay. But the threat of unilateral measures enables
the sovereign borrower to press for reschedulings. The LDCs'
incentives to follow sound economic policies may be strengthened,
if this option can be rendered unattractive by some contractual
mechanism. The stronger position of the creditors when sovereign
risk is reduced enables them to reject reschedulings in the ab-
sence of exogenous shocks; on the other hand banks may be better
prepared to share exogenous shock risks as they already do in
national markets.
III. A Contract System to Reduce Sovereign Risk
Before a contractual mechanism to reduce the sovereign risk can
be designed it must be clarified in which way unwillingness to
pay influences the country's repayment decisions. Due to the
unenforceability of loans the country follows a simple cost/bene-
fit-calculus in deciding on repayment. The calculus can be for-
malized as the integral of the future costs and benefits of a
reduced debt repayment :
r"
1
(t/S,R,D) - C (t/S,R,D)] dt
The benefits and costs are subject to the repayment strategy
chosen by the country. Distinction is made between contractual
service of the loan (S), rescheduling or partial default by so-
vereign action (R), and outright default (D). With unenforceable
claims the creditors can impose costs on the borrowing country
only by denying future loans that would be advantageous for thecountry or by demanding higher risk premiums. Continued lending
may be profitable for the creditors as well. Their reaction thus
will depend on the degree of debt relief pressed for by the bor-
rowing country. An outright default can be expected to result in
a total credit stop for future time. The syndication of inter-
national bank loans to LDCs and the use of cross default clauses
has improved the credibility of this threat, which cannot be
generated by a single creditor if the country maintains several
credit relations. The LDCs seem to have been aware of this fact
and avoided outright defaults in the past, but tried to reach
reschedulings using the threat of an outright or partial default
g
to induce the banks to participate . This indicates that re-
schedulings are regarded as superior in cost/benefit terms to an
outright default by the LDCs. Outright default might even be
considered inferior to the contractual servicing of the loan as
long as the country is able to repay and the consideration of
g
default is only driven by unwillingness to pay .
The basic characterization of sovereign risk consists of a bor-
rowing country's unwillingness to pay notwithstanding that it is
able to pay. In the following paragraphs, we thus focus on coun-
tries unwilling, but able to repay their debts when discussing as
to how to reduce the sovereign risk within a contract system.
Subsequently the possibility of an reduced ability to pay as the
reason for payments difficulties will be considered. The mecha-
nism to induce sovereign borrowers not to defer debt payments due
to unwillingness to pay has to modify the cost/benefit-calculus
in a way that makes reschedulings and partial defaults unfavour-
able for the country compared to servicing the loan contract.IIIili_Self-enforceable_contracts
With regard to the above arguments the possible actions of a
borrowing country can be ranked as follows with respect to their




highest utility -> lowest utility
Rescheduling Contractual Outright default
Loan Repayment
Contractual Rescheduling Outright default
Loan Repayment
We are looking for modifications of the present loan contracts
that shall make contract servicing the best choice for the bor-
rower, as well. This is equivalent to establishing self-enforcing
contracts, that are characterized by the following utility rank-
ing for the borrower :
T
f [B (t=S) - C (t=S)] (l+5)"
t dt >
T
max f [B (t=R,D) - C (t=R,D)] (l+6)~
t dt
R,D t
for all t = 0, ..., T.
The reduction of sovereign risk should not only be in the in-
terest of the lending banks but also favourable for the borrowing
LDCs. Without the enforceability of loan contracts the banks
cannot distinguish whether deferred payments are caused by in-10
ability or unwillingness to pay. The presence of unwillingness to
pay induces the banks to expect a relatively higher risk of re-
schedulings, which leads to higher risk premiums or even credit
rationing. In order to achieve better terms, the LDCs could try
to bind themselves credibly not to press for reschedulings be-
cause of unwillingness to pay. This could be done by offering
some form of collateral for the loan. This collateral must con-
sist of foreign assets of the borrowing country that are not
subject to sovereign risk. Claims on foreign banks or foreign
direct investments of the country meet this requirement as well
as future claims on official development assistance or financing
agreements with international organizations such as the World
Bank, IMF, or IDA. However, these binding devices do not look
very promising, especially for the middle-income LDCs that would
profit most from enhanced private borrowing facilities.
The recent offer by Mexico to swap bank loans against bonds
with the principal of the later guaranteed through a zero-bond
deposited at the US-Treasury did not attract as much partici-
pation as expected. Apparently the discount on the loan's face
value was regarded as too high
Foreign assets and reserves of the mayor borrowing countries
are rather small relative to the loan disbursements in 1982
which is regarded as the last year before the debt crisis led
to drastic credit rationing (Table 2).
The same applies to ODA-payments that are negligible for
middle-income countries as well (Table 2). The commitment of
the borrowing country to forgo these payments in case of de-11













































































Sources: The World Bank, World Debt Tables. Washington, D.C. 1987/88, Vol. II. -
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Washington, D.C. Jan. 1988. - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
Countries 1982-1985. Paris 1987.12
ferred loan repayment thus constitutes no credible binding
device.
Moreover, it is generally questionable, whether international
organizations should be included in the process of imposing
sanctions on countries which willfully refuse payments. Payment
difficulties that are due to an inability to pay constitute the
cornerstone for the activities of these organizations. They may
thus be strongly inclined to classify deferred payments as caused
by inability to pay. Even if the borrowing country agreed ex ante
to sanctions in case of unwillingness, it is in the interest of
both the international organization and the country to deny that
12 a given default is due to unwillingness . Such an outcome will
be most likely, if it is difficult to decide whether payment
difficulties are due to unwillingness or inability to pay.
IIIi2^_Sanctions_in_Case_of_Reschedulings_due_to_Unwillingness_to
Pay
In view of these difficulties the mechanism of sanctions imposed
13 on borrowing countries in cases of reschedulings must meet the
following objectives: the imposition of sanctions must be in the
interest of the party that has to decide on them and it has to be
prevented that the countries escape the sanctions by sovereign
measures. The sanctions consist of inducing the country's cre-
ditors to change their lending behavior after reschedulings in a
way that imposes costs on the borrower. The creditor's reaction
effects the utility ranking of the possible actions available to
the sovereign borrower when deciding on loan repayments. In par-Bibliothek
das Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
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ticular, the countries take into account the threat of a credit
stop after an outright default. For that reason the proposed
mechanism aims at inducing the creditors to react after resche-
dulings in a way comparable to the case of an outright default.
Today LDCs prefer reschedulings to outright defaults exactly
because of the fact that a uniform reaction in both cases is not
favourable for the banks.
To generate the new incentives necessary to induce the creditors
to change their behavior new loan contracts should incorporate
the obligation for the creditor to enter an additional contract
with a third party belonging to the same jurisdiction as the
creditor. Because the third party contract would be subject to
national jurisdiction problems of enforceability do not exist and
incentives can be specified which will drive the behavior of the
creditors in case of reschedulings. For that purpose the contract
can specify a premium the creditor will have to pay to the third
party, if he wants to continue the loan contract with the bor-
rowing country after reschedulings have taken place. The premium
would be fixed in advance at a level high enough to lead to a
negative present value of the loan contract for the creditor if
14 the premium payments are taken into account . The premium may
take the form of a front-end fee in percent of the outstanding
loan or of annual percentage payments over the loan term. The
creditor can be supposed to prefer to withdraw from the loan
contract as soon as the third party requests premium payments
after a rescheduling. In this case there will be no subsequent
repayments and no premium payments, too. The third party would14
have a strong incentive to enforce the premium payment after a
rescheduling has occurred, because it entails no obligation for
considerations and therefore constitute an unusual profit oppor-
tunity. The creditor would thus insist on continuing the old loan
contract rather than renegotiate, because this still entails some
probability of repayment. Knowing about this, the borrowing coun-
try can be supposed to abstain from pressing for a rescheduling
and service the loan. Otherwise the costs to be born by the coun-
try would be as high as in the case of an outright default. To
secure this result the third party must be given the right to
enforce the premium payments also in the case of a partial de-
fault. This provision rules out that the country attempts to
circumvent the contract system by reducing the loan terms uni-
laterally rather than asking for a rescheduling. The fact that
the country has expectations about the results which the creditor
would accept if renegotiations took place, would otherwise lead
the country to imitate these results through unilateral actions.
Until now, the contract proposal has been advanced with regard to
only one creditor. In reality LDCs obtain credit from many banks
with the credit volume of each bank typically being small rela-
tive to the LDCs total debt. This was especially true in the
1970s when syndicated bank loans dominated LDC-borrowing. Syndi-
cation of the loans to sovereign borrowrs aimed at protecting
individual banks against defaults and forced reschedulings due to
unwillingness to pay. Cross default clauses serve to ensure that
the syndicate holds together. They allow each member bank con-
fronted with deferred payments to pass on losses to the other15
banks according to their quotas in the syndicated loan. However,
spreading losses arising from LDC actions over the whole syndi-
cate does not necessarily provide a credible threat to prevent
the borrowing LDC from deferring payments. The later requires
collective actions by the syndicated banks to impose costs on the
LDC. As long as the division of the costs from willful payment
deferments does not induce collective actions with some high
probability the LDCs have the incentive to reduce their debt
burden by unilateral modifications of the loan terms or forced
reschedulings.
But the threat of collective actions by the loan syndicate is not
credible even if it agreed ex ante that all banks will withdraw
from their present and future loan contracts in case of deferred
payments. If the LDC reduces debt payments unilaterally, each
bank will have the incentive to break with the syndicate and
continue its credit relations with the LDC on the basis of the
easier terms, because receiving a reduced repayment is more
favourable for the individual bank than to withdraw from the loan
contract completely. This incentive problem on the side of the
lending banks characterizes the dilemma exploited by the LDCs
when pressing for renegotiations in the present situation.
In order to keep the threat of the creditor's withdrawal from the
loan contract credible, the premium must ideally be claimed from
all banks that want to continue their credit relations. That
would require all creditors of a country to participate in the
contract system. In this setting the third party will achieve the16
right to enforce the premium payments, if the LDC forces only one
bank into reschedulings or defaults partially. All banks would
then prefer to withdraw from the loan contracts and stop future
credit relations with the LDC. It can be expected that the re-
action of the banks with regard to future credit would be equi-
valent to their response to an outright default. It does not make
any difference whether the loan is lost because of an outright
default or "voluntary" withdrawal. To summarize, the proposed
contract system assures that loans are self-enforceable as long
as the country's ability to pay is not reduced. This is because
the costs of deferred payments would be higher than the costs of
contractual servicing of the debt.
I55i3^_R§§chedul ing's _in_Case_of_In§bilitY_to_PaY
Up to this point unwillingness to pay has been assumed to be the
only reason for deferred payments and following this assumption
reschedulings should be made as unfavourable for the borrowing
country as an outright default. However, deferred payments may
also be due to a reduced ability to pay. For that reason the
contract system has to be modified in a way that it is capable to
deal with these cases as well. Principally the contract system
must allow for reschedulings if the country proves unable to pay.
As in national credit markets it seems reasonable to promote
risk-sharing between borrowers and creditors in cases of exo-
genous shocks that reduce the borrowers' ability to pay. On the
other hand it must be maintained that creditors are in a position
to control the borrower's unwillingness to pay and by doing so to
reduce the economic policy risk as well. These objectives could17
be achieved by granting creditors the option to reschedule their
loans without activating the third party contract, if the resche-
duling creditor declares the rescheduling to be in his own inte-
rest. A lending bank confronted with the request for rescheduling
would then have the choice to put the third party contract out of
force and reschedule the loan, or to reject the rescheduling, if
it expects full repayment of the loan under the contract system.
It is not in the bank's interest to reject all demands for re-
scheduling, because the utility ranking of the possible repayment
strategies for the borrowing country will change if it is unable
to pay and no longer just unwilling. A reduced ability to pay
increases the costs of repaying the loan whereas the costs of a
default remain constant. If the bank rejects to reschedule and
keep the contract system in force, the country is left with the
options to repay the full amount or to default on the whole loan.
Every partial default would be transformed by the contract system
into a withdrawal of all banks which results in a situation equi-
valent to an initial outright default. The borrowing country
will choose to default, if its ability to pay is severely reduced
and this strategy thus results in a higher utility for the coun-
try than repaying the loan. For the bank an outright default is
certainly associated with higher costs than every rescheduling
agreement that would have prevented the country from defaulting.
For that reason it would be advantageous for the lending banks to
agree to reschedulings when they expect the borrowing country to
take resort to an outright default after its request for a re-
scheduling has been rejected.18
The calculus of the bank can be depicted by assigning expected
pay-offs and probabilities to the possible situations that can
arise from rejecting or accepting to reschedule. The relevant
probability refers to the behaviour of the borrowing country
after the bank has rejected the rescheduling. The bank must thus
form an expectation about the probability of an outright default
[E Prob (D)]. The utility ranking of the possible pay-offs for



















The condition that is decisive for the acceptance of a resche-
duling by the creditor follows directly as
u [X2] > u [(1 - E Prob (D)) • X± + E Prob (D)
Rearranging this expression and assuming a risk-neutral creditor
with a strictly increasing utility function yields
E Prob (D) >
Xl ~
 X219
IV. Incentives for a Better Monitoring by the Creditors
The proposed contract system requires that the creditors engage
in forming expectations about the ability to pay of the borrowing
country. Only if the creditor makes use of the rescheduling
option in cases he believes to be characterized by a reduced
ability to pay, he can obtain the whole benefit from the system.
Serious evaluation of the countries
1 ability to pay is required,
e.g. by establishing an appropriate monitoring system. Monitoring
is costly, however, and the banks will only devote more resources
to this activity, if they expect the associated benefits to out-
weigh the costs. It is thus most important to discuss whether or
not the proposed system constitutes positive incentives for the
banks to evaluate the LDCs' ability to pay more carefully than
without the system.
The monitoring systems for the evaluation of the LDCs' ability to
pay will be improved, if the necessary investment outlays are
compensated by expected profits due to better decisions on re-
quests for reschedulings. The expected profits will be the higher
the stronger the relation is between a good evaluation of the
country's ability to pay and a correct decision. Furthermore high
losses in case of wrong decisions are expected to increase moni-
toring expenses. At present the creditor's evaluation of the
borrowing country's ability to pay is not the only factor that
influences his decision. He has to take into account as well the
possibility of unilateral actions by the sovereign borrower after
rescheduling has been refused. These actions might be more costly20
than an unwarranted rescheduling. The proposed contract system
reduces the sovereign risk and upgrades the technical aspect of
evaluating the country's ability to pay. Thereby the position of
the creditor in the contract relation becomes comparable to that
in the national credit markets.
In addition, the introduction of the contract system changes the
pay-off structure of a creditor's decision on rescheduling re-
quests in a favourable way. In case of accepted reschedulings the
pay-off can be expected to remain the same irrespective of whe-
ther or nor the contract system is introduced. The incentive for
the creditor to improve his indicator system can only result from
a better repayment structure in case of refused reschedulings.
Today there are three possible strategies for the borrowing coun-
try after its request for a rescheduling has been rejected:
The country unilaterally reduces the debt payments because it
is really unable to service the whole debt. Pursuing this
strategy the country will act in accordance with its cost/
benefit-calculus and abstain from a complete outright default
(case 1).
The country unilaterally reduces the debt payments although it
is able to pay. Though driven by an unwillingness to pay the
degree to which debt payments are reduced nevertheless depends
on the cost/benefit-calculus; an outright default is rather
unlikely in this case as well. The creditor is not able to
distinguish this second strategy from the first one (case 2).21
The country services the debt contractually, because it is
able to do so and its unwillingness to pay is not strong
enough to trigger unilateral measures after the creditor has
rejected a rescheduling (case 3).
The first case is associated with a wrong decision of the cre-
ditor on the rescheduling. The second and third case are both
possible after a correct decision, but only in the last one
losses will be prevented, if the country's ability to pay is
correctly evaluated. Without the contract system it seems un-
likely that the country's willingness to pay will recover as in
case 3, because no credible mechanism exists that imposes sanc-
tions in case of sovereign measures reducing the debt payments.
Under the proposed contract system the strategies open to the
borrowing country after a rejected rescheduling would be limited
to the following:
Stop of all future credit relations because the ability to
service the debt is not given and the country has no choice
but to reduce the debt payments unilaterally (case 4).
Contractual debt servicing despite of unwillingness to pay
(case 5).
The expected total benefit for the creditor from a decision on
the request for a rescheduling under the contract system can be
depicted in a matrix (Table 4). The benefit is given as the re-



































Capital letter: without contract system










the losses associated with a rescheduling are
assumed to be the same
the cases 1 and 2 result in the same loss due to
the borrowing country's cost/benefit-calculus
the loss in case 4 equals the present value of
the loan
probability of unilateral measures due to
unwillingness to pay after the creditor rejected
the rescheduling (case 2)
probability of a wrong decision on the side of
the creditor23
present situation without third party contracts. The matrix shows
15 a bayesian decision problem . The expected loss for the creditor
after the borrowing country has asked for a rescheduling is given
by the sum of the expected losses under the two possible states
of the country's ability to pay. The two outcomes are weighted
with the probabilities the creditor assigns to each of them.
v = p [(i-n)v
r + nv*] + (l-p) [nv
r + (l-roov*]
v = p [(i-mv
r + nd*] + d-p) nv
r
p: probability, as expected by the creditor, that the request for
a rescheduling is due to inability to pay.
The expected loss will drop, if the creditor improves his moni-
toring system and thus reduces the probability fl. The proposed
contract system strengthens the incentives for a better evalua-
tion of the countries' ability to pay since the reduction in
losses for a given reduction of PI is greater with the contract
system than without. Formally this can be proven by partially
differentiating the loss functions:
— = V




r (l-2p) + pd > 024
The derivation 6v/6n is always greater than 6V/6n , which con-
firms the positive incentive produced by the system.
However, it is open to question, if the incentive is strong
enough to make the creditors act accordingly. The analysis pre-
sented above cannot determine whether or not the reduction of the
expected loss outweighs the higher evaluation costs necessary to
reduce fl. However, it can safely be ruled out that the proposed
contract system creates "wrong" incentives in the sense that the
creditor's behavior under the system results in an inferior de-
velopment as compared to the present situation. At present, the
banks' attitudes are strongly biased in favour of accepting re-
schedulings if the LDCs are pressing hard. This behaviour is
rational, if the banks expect the losses from possible sovereign
measures after reschedulings have been rejected to be higher than
the costs associated with reschedulings. It is also possible that
banks regard the general acceptance of reschedulings to be cost
minimizing because of the expenses otherwise required for estab-
lishing and maintaining an elaborate monitoring system. This
consideration is enforced by the fact that monitoring system
alone cannot cope with sovereign risks. The proposed contract
system may be seen by the banks as a viable enforcing mechanism
that makes monitoring attractive. In the worst of all worlds, the
introduction of the contract system will have no impact on the
banks' calculation of the benefits associated with respect to
acceptance or rejection of reschedulings. In this case the banks
will still regard the general acceptance of reschedulings as the
most profitable choice, because the incentives created by the25
contract system in favour of a differentiated behavior remain too
weak. But the system does also cause no harm, because the cre-
ditors still have the option to accept reschedulings and thereby
prevent the premium payments. The banks are thus able to generate
a situation comparable to the present one.
All in all, the system offers the chance to improve the stability
of future credit relations in the international market at the
minor risk to give rise to some transaction costs when establish-
ing the third party contracts.
IV^l^ More_Stable_Credit_Relations_as_a_Result_of_the_Contract
System
Assuming that the incentives generated by of the contract system
are strong enough to induce banks and LDCs to change their be-
haviour, the stability of international lending will be enhanced
in various ways. First of all, the willingness of banks to engage
in risk-sharing with the LDCs is likely to increase, because debt
renegotiations and reschedulings can now be limited to those
cases of payments difficulties the banks consider to be due to
exogenous shocks.
Secondly, the decision of single banks to renegotiate their
claims is no longer constrained by the bank syndicate pressing
for unanimous actions to maintain its bargaining power. The con-
tract system removes the necessity to syndicate bank loans for
reasons of loan security; the third party contracts would assume26
this role. Each bank may thus decide individually on the accept-
ance of a country's request for renegotiations on the basis of
its own monitoring system of the country's ability to pay and its
risk preference. The rescheduling improves the borrowing coun-
try's ability to pay and reduces the repayment risk for the non-
rescheduling banks, because the country will only default due to
an inability to pay. For that reason the individual rescheduling
bank generates positive external effects. It may thus be possible
that each bank chosses to act strategically and reject reschedu-
lings. But this strategic behavior does not make reschedulings
unlikely; it just requires that the individual bank's expected
losses in case of a rejected rescheduling, which include the
possible external benefits from reschedulings by other banks,
exceed the bank's rescheduling losses. Still the bank with the
lowest failure rate in deciding on reschedulings realizes higher
loan pay-offs than its competitors. This strengthens the incen-
tives for a good monitoring of the countries' ability to pay.
Thirdly the introduction of self-enforceable contracts might
reduce the economic policy risk in international lending, al-
though this cannot be determined conclusively. Legal measures to
seize assets of the borrower as a means of forced repayment, that
are available to creditors in national markets are not at the
disposal of international creditors even under the proposed con-
tract system. Financing unprofitable projects with loans often
implies later reschedulings. Nevertheless, this may benefit a
country, if it is possible to claim exogenous shocks to be the
reason for the necessary rescheduling and thus maintain future27
credit relations. Under the contract system, however, the country-
may find it harder to convince the creditor of exogenous shocks,
especially if its own economic policy decisions are responsible
for the payment difficulties. The reduction of sovereign risk
weakens the bargaining position of the borrowing country and
makes it easier for the creditor to argue that the country's
references to exogenous shocks are unjustified. This may force
the country to provide more specific information on its. economic
situation in order to convince the creditor. For that reasons,
the borrowing country will face an increased risk of being ex-
cluded from future credit if it chanels loans into inefficient
projects.
V. Chances to Introduce the Contract System
It is open to a market test whether or not the proposed system of
self-enforceable contracts can be introduced in the international
credit market. The intention of an LDC to raise new spontaneous
loans with the help of the contract system must be met by a cor-
responding conviction of the banks that a reduced sovereign risk
makes new loans profitable. The incentives for the introduction
of the scheme are contingent on the prevailing and expected cred-
it market conditions. Borrowers generally prefer loans without
further obligations. But under present conditions LDCs relying
only on unconditional loans are typically subject to credit-ra-
17 tioning . They should thus have an incentive to reduce the
supply constraints by suggesting third party contracts. The28
lending banks can be expected to participate voluntarily in the
contract system, because they can perform at least as good as
without the system by using their option to accept renegotia-
18 tions . For that reasons it seems possible that the proposed
contract system improves international credit relations in the
paretian sense.
The introduction of the contract system would not rule out addi-
tional credit financing outside the system. As in the present
situation, banks lending without third party contracts would not
be sheltered against reschedulings enforced by the sovereign
power of the borrowing LDCs. Higher interest rates of such loans
would reflect the higher risks. The share of loans inside and
outside the contract system has an influence on the interest rate
of secured loans. A high share of loans inside the system implies
high potential costs for the borrower in case of deferred pay-
ments and reduces the risk of sovereign measures. This implies
lower interest rates. Therefore it is in the LDC's interest to
induce as many banks as possible to participate in the contract
system. This may be accomplished by LDCs initially offering that
the interest rate of loans under the contract scheme is reduced
only gradually, despite of the reduced sovereign risk.
The central element of the proposed scheme to reduce sovereign
risk consists of additional contracts between the creditors and a
third party. The enforcement of the premium payments by the third
party in cases of deferred payments is decisive for the function-
ing of the system. It has to be determined, if the third party29
can be a private institution or if public involvement is re-
quired. For that purpose the content of the third party contract
must be considered. In this contract no payments and considera-
tions have to be specified except the premiums payable by credi-
tors willing to continue their loan contracts with a country that
has unilaterally reduced some or all of its debt payments. The
contract seems to offer an unusual profit opportunity to the
third party. However, the expected profit is zero, because every
creditor would prefer to withdraw from the loan contract rather
than to continue it with the obligation to pay the premium; More-
over, the third party bears the costs of the surveillance of the
loan contracts. Although surveillance costs are supposed to be
marginal, they render the role of the third party unprofitable
for private institutions. Due to the negative expected pay-off,
the public provision of the third party function seems to be
necessary. This can be justified-, because the contract system
would serve as a partial substitute for an international legal
system. The third party engages in the supply of a public good.
The surveillance costs may even be passed on to the favoured
creditors and borrowers30
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